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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
IN THE MATTER OF 
: CaseNo.20040489-CA 
DAVID WEISKOPF, 
: (not incarcerated) 
A person over 18 years of age. 
JURISDICTION 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3, (c) and (e) provide this Court's jurisdiction over this 
appeal from a final order of criminal contempt entered in the juvenile court. 
ISSUE, STANDARDS OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Did the juvenile court err in finding Mr. Weiskopf guilty of criminal contempt? 
In reviewing contempt citations, courts review for an abuse of lawful discretion. 
See Bartholomew v. Bartholomew. 548 P.2d 238, 240 (Utah 1976). 
This Court reviews findings of fact for clear error, and reviews the ultimate legal 
question of whether an attorney violated a duty without deference, for correctness. See. 
e.g.. State v. Long, 844 P.2d 381 (Utah App. 1992). 
Issues concerning the proper procedure for issuing contempt citations are reviewed 
for correctness, as questions of law. See, e.g.. Barton v. Barton, 2001 UT App 199, 29 
P.3dl3, 15. 
The arguments presented in this brief were presented before the trial court in a 
motion to reconsider (R. 35-37), and orally when the court revealed that he had decided to 
reverse himself and hold Weiskopf in contempt (R. 47 at 269). 
To the extent that the issues were not fully preserved, this is attributable to the trial 
court's procedural errors, which deprived Weiskopf of fair notice and a fair opportunity to 
be heard. Because of the plain and prejudicial nature of the errors, and the unique 
procedural facts of this case, this Court could and should address all the errors regardless 
of preservation under the plain error and extraordinary circumstances doctrines.1 
CONTROLLING STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1. Acts and omissions constituting contempt 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings therein are 
contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge while holding 
the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, tending to 
Counsel for Weiskopf believes that the issues were properly preserved. Out of an 
abundance of caution, however, he asserts that the facts of this case meet the elements of 
the plain error and extraordinary circumstances doctrines. 
Courts utilize the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in cases involving "'rare 
procedural anomalies,5" as a "'safety device'" to avoid manifest injustice. State v. 
Nelson-Waggoner. 2004 UT 29, % 23, 94 P.3d 186. 
The plain error doctrine requires a showing that an obvious and harmful error 
occurred which prejudiced the defendant's substantial rights, although the obviousness 
prong may be relaxed when a highly prejudicial error occurred which is more obvious in 
hindsight than it likely was before the trial court. See, e.g.. State v. Eldredge, 773 P.2d 
29, 35 and n.8 (Utah), cert denied, 493 U.S. 814 (1989). Constitutional errors are 
particularly appropriate for correction under the plain error doctrine. See, e.g.. United 
States v. Lindsay, 184 F.3d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.\ cert, denied, 145 L.Ed.2d 343 (1999). 
As is explained herein, the court's procedural errors so deviated from well-
established constitutional norms and so prejudiced Weiskopf as to merit full relief on 
appeal. 
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interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(3) Misbehavior in office, or other willful neglect or violation of duty by an 
attorney, counsel, clerk, sheriff, or other person appointed or elected to perform a 
judicial or ministerial service. 
(4) Deceit, or abuse of the process or proceedings of the court, by a party to an 
action or special proceeding. 
(5) Disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process of the court. 
(6) Assuming to be an officer, attorney or counselor of a court, and acting as such 
without authority. 
(7) Rescuing any person or property in the custody of an officer by virtue of an 
order or process of such court. 
(8) Unlawfully detaining a witness or party to an action while going to, remaining 
at, or returning from, the court where the action is on the calendar for trial. 
(9) Any other unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court. 
(10) Disobedience of a subpoena duly served, or refusing to be sworn or to answer 
as a witness. 
(11) When summoned as a juror in a court, neglecting to attend or serve as such, or 
improperly conversing with a party to an action to be tried at such court, or with 
any other person, concerning the merits of such action, or receiving a 
communication from a party or other person in respect to it, without immediately 
disclosing the same to the court. 
(12) Disobedience by an inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer of the lawful 
judgment, order or process of a superior court, or proceeding in an action or 
special proceeding contrary to law, after such action or special proceeding is 
removed from the jurisdiction of such inferior tribunal, magistrate or officer. 
Disobedience of the lawful orders or process of a judicial officer is also a contempt 
of the authority of such officer. 
§ 78-32-3. In immediate presence of court; summary action—Without immediate 
presence; procedure 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, or 
judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which an order must be 
made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate view and presence, 
adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby guilty of a contempt, and 
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that he be punished as prescribed in Section 78-32-10 hereof. When the contempt 
is not committed in the immediate view and presence of the court or judge at 
chambers, an affidavit shall be presented to the court or judge of the facts 
constituting the contempt, or a statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators 
or other judicial officers. 
§ 78-32-10. Contempt—Action by court 
Upon the answer and evidence taken, the court shall determine whether the person 
proceeded against is guilty of the contempt charged. If the court finds the person is 
guilty of the contempt, the court may impose a fine not exceeding $1,000, order 
the person incarcerated in the county jail not exceeding 30 days, or both. However, 
a justice court judge or court commissioner may punish for contempt by a fine not 
to exceed $500 or by incarceration for five days or both. 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-1-403 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a 
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different 
offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried 
under Subsection 76-1-402(2) in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(i) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iii) was improperly terminated; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or judgment for the defendant that has not 
been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be established to secure conviction in the 
subsequent prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not guilty by the 
trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient evidence to warrant 
conviction. A finding of guilty of a lesser included offense is an acquittal of the 
greater offense even though the conviction for the lesser included offense is 
subsequently reversed, set aside, or vacated. 
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(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of guilt that has 
not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting a judgment; or a 
plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
(4) There is an improper termination of prosecution if the termination takes place 
before the verdict, is for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place 
after a jury has been impanelled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial 
is waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of prosecution is 
not improper if: 
(a) The defendant consents to the termination; or 
(b) The defendant waives his right to object to the termination; 
(c) The court finds and states for the record that the termination is necessary 
because: 
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with the trial in conformity with the law; 
or 
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would 
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law; or 
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not attributable to the state 
makes it impossible to proceed with the trial without injustice to the defendant or 
the state; or 
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict; or 
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire prevent a fair trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION 
During the course of a joint certification hearing for two juveniles on May 11, 
2004, Judge J. Mark Andrus of the Second District Juvenile Court found the conduct of 
Deputy County Attorney David Weiskopf contemptuous, but informed Weiskopf that he 
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would not hold him in contempt (T. 80).2 The court signed two written orders in the 
juveniles' cases reflecting that he found Weiskopf s conduct contemptuous, but that the 
court would not hold him in contempt (in addendum).3 
When the joint certification hearing concluded ten days later on May 21, 2004, 
Judge Andrus informed Weiskopf that he had changed his mind and was holding Andrus 
in contempt (R. 46 at 267). The court entered written findings reflecting that he was 
prompted to hold Weiskopf in contempt as a result of Weiskopf s history of 
contemptuous behavior which preceded the May 11, 2004 hearing, but the court did not 
identify any such conduct by date or case number or name, or in any fashion (R. 17-18). 
The court did not indicate whether all of the unspecified instances of misbehavior 
occurred in or outside the presence of the court (R. 17-18). 
The court set Weiskopf s sentencing for May 26, 2004, and denied Weiskopf s 
motion to continue the sentencing, depriving Weiskopf of an opportunity to review the 
record of the joint certification hearing to prepare to defend himself (R. 18, 40-41). 
At sentencing, the court imposed a sentence of thirty days in jail and a fine of 
$1,000, and then suspended all but two days of the jail time and all but $200 of the fine, 
2At the time of the writing of this brief, the district court clerk had yet to paginate 
the first page of the May 11, 2004 transcript. Hence, counsel for Weiskopf refers to this 
transcript as "T." 
3At the time of the writing of this brief, these two minute entries had yet to be 
paginated by the clerk. Hence, counsel for Weiskopf does not cite to them by record page 
number, but has included them in the addendum to his brief, after moving the Court to 
include them in the record, with the stipulation of counsel for the State. 
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conditioned on Weiskopf s compliance for a year with standing orders regarding 
courtroom decorum (R. 48 at 3-4). 
In sentencing Weiskopf, the court complained of and relied on Weiskopf s 
behaviors in other unspecified cases, without specifying whether all of these alleged 
behaviors occurred inside or outside the court's presence, and acknowledged that only 
two of the complained of behaviors had occurred in the joint certification hearing on May 
1 lth (R. 48 at 2-3). 
The court then complimented Weiskopf, indicating that the court liked the work he 
did in the court. The court stated, 
You work your butt off, you care about the kids, and 99 percent of 
the time you're a great attorney. I would like to see that continue for a long 
time. And I know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult to deal 
with, I just have to make those, and I hope you can find a way to make this 
work and keep doing the good things you're doing. 
(R. 48 at 4). 
The court entered a written "Sentence on Contempt of Court" again referring to 
Weiskopf s poor behavior in past, unspecified cases (R. 38). 
On June 10, 2004, counsel for Weiskopf filed a motion to reconsider and to stay 
the sentence imposed pending a hearing (R. 35-37), and on June 11, 2004, counsel moved 
the trial court to issue a certificate of probable cause pending appeal (R. 28-30). 
The court denied the motion to reconsider and to stay the sentence on June 10, 
2004 (R. 33-34). 
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Counsel for Weiskopf filed a notice of appeal (R. 14).4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Because Mr. Weiskopf did not have the benefit of a trial or an evidentiary hearing 
prior to the issuance of the contempt citation, the available facts are limited, and largely 
expand upon those stated in the Nature of the Case section of this brief, supra. 
The appellant, David Weiskopf, is a Deputy Weber County Attorney, who was 
representing the State in the Second District Juvenile Court in and for Weber County, 
before Juvenile Court Judge J. Mark Andrus, in a consolidated certification hearing in In 
reJLC, Case Number 135570, and In re J.O.. Case Number 935953, on May 11, 2004 (in 
addendum). 
During the course of that hearing, defense counsel objected to a sworn written 
statement of Alex Espinosa, who was not present, and after the parties argued the 
admissibility of the evidence, the court ruled that it was inadmissible (T. 74-75). The 
court premised its ruling on its interpretation of a specific case, and after the court ruled, 
Mr. Weiskopf pointed out that the case relied on by the court supported admitting the 
statement, as did a specific statute (T. 75). The court indicated that it had made its ruling, 
4Because Weiskopf s fine was payable to the court, rather than to a party, and 
because two days of the jail sentence and $200 of the fine were not suspended, the 
contempt is properly characterized as criminal and appealable. See, Von Hake v. 
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1168-69 (Utah 1988) (contempt is characterized as criminal and 
therefore is appealable if part of sentence is fixed and may not be purged by condemner, 
and if fine it to be paid to court, rather than to a party). 
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and Mr. Weiskopf stated, 
All right. The State []notes that [ruling is] in stark contrast [to the] 
plain language and the definition in the code and the Court has already 
shown hostility to the prosecution and we wonder why they're trying to 
keep evidence out that's clearly provided for in the law. 
(T. 75). 
The court then stated, 
Mr. Weiskopf, your statements are inappropriate. The next time that 
you argue with my rulings after I've made a ruling, I will find you in 
contempt of court. I'm directing you not to do that -
(T. 75). 
Mr. Weiskopf asked for a continuance to facilitate an appeal from the court's 
ruling, and the court denied the motion (T. 75-76). The court granted a recess at the 
prosecution's request, and Weiskopf asked, "So you're saying we need to present Alex 
Espinosa?" (T. 76). The court said that he had made his ruling, and then Weiskopf 
interrupted and asked for a continuance "since the Court gave us this new slant on what a 
certification" (T. 76). The court interrupted Weiskopf for the ten minute break (T. 76). 
Following the break, the court made a record of his perspective of what had 
occurred in chambers, stating, 
Okay. I'm going to make a record of a discussion that we had in 
chambers just a few moments ago. Counsel had requested to speak with the 
Court in chambers and had the attorneys, Mr. Weiskopf for the State, Ms. 
Sipes for Jeffrey Ortega, and Ms. Clark for Javier Cisneros in my chambers. 
There was a question raised by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the Court 
had just made and how it might impact future evidence that he intends to 
offer and after hearing what he had to say, I indicated that I was not going 
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to re-argue the motion or the ruling there in the chambers and Mr. Weiskopf 
started bringing up the issue again. I repeated that I was not going to argue 
the issue there and he started bringing it up again and then I raised my voice 
and said I'm not going to argue it at this point. He then turned to me and 
said, "I haven't screamed at you, Judge, but you've now screamed at me 
twice," and then he said, "Judge, I've had it." and then he repeated, "I've 
had it" addressing those remarks to the Court. 
(T. 76-77). 
When the court asked if counsel disputed his recitation, one of the defense 
lawyers, Ms. Sipes, said she did not dispute the court's version, but Mr. Weiskopf did 
disagree. The court permitted him to record his version of what transpired, and he stated: 
That when I brought up the issue of similar evidence, you said that we were 
free to try and work out a stipulation but you weren't going to rehear an 
argument which recognized that we were doing more than really hearing an 
argument. I was trying to address with counsel and the Court an 
arrangement with respect to a similar kind of evidence. So it wasn't my just 
directing re-argument toward you and you specifically acknowledged that 
by addressing that I was bringing up a new issue of evidence that could be 
spoken about and then you characterized it as arguing and kept saying you 
weren't going to reargue, the two times like you said and then I tried to 
bring your attention back to this and you screamed at me and then you got 
up and approached me in an angry manner and continued to scream at me 
and then I turned at you and said, "You've screamed at me twice today, the 
other time being when the defense counsel was almost an hour late and I 
simply said I want to make a record that this is not fair, I'm unhappy. I do 
not recall - does anyone recall being told this hearing may be delayed? It's 
not fair to the witnesses, it's not fair to the victim." And you screamed at 
me, "Well, what am I suppose to do about it" or something like that. 
(T. 77-78). 
The other defense lawyer, Ms. Clark, then indicated that the judge did not scream 
at Mr. Weiskopf when Weiskopf complained about the tardiness of the other lawyer, but 
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simply said, "Yes, it may be unfair but, you know, what can I do about it?" (T. 78). 
Mr. Weiskopf noted his belief that there was a tape of that conversation (T. 78).5 
Ms. Clark clarified that there was no screaming by the judge in chambers, although 
the judge did raise his voice one time, as the judge had recognized (T. 78). She saw the 
judge walking out with the attorneys, but did not see him move toward Mr. Weiskopf (T. 
78-79). 
Weiskopf then asked if the judge denied approaching Weiskopf directly as they 
were leaving chambers, and the court responded, 
I did not scream at you at all today either on the prior incident or at 
the incident in my office. I did raise my voice once at you after I had twice 
told you that I was not going to reargue the matter and told you that you 
could talk that over with counsel and see if you could stipulate something 
but that I was not going to reargue my ruling. I did walk toward you as 
everyone was leaving the room and as I was headed in the direction as well, 
but I was not approaching you in an angry manner. 
(T. 79). 
Defense counsel Sipes then apologized for delaying the hearing earlier in the day, 
and volunteered that she did not know how the court could have left chambers without 
walking around the desk that Weiskopf was standing by, and that she would not 
characterize the judge as screaming or yelling at Weiskopf (T. 79-80). 
The court then stated, 
5Counsel for Weiskopf had been unable to locate a tape of the proceedings before 
defense counsel arrived and the joint certification hearing ensued. It apparently was not 
recorded. 
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Now, I'm going to warn you again, Mr. Weiskopf, it was very 
inappropriate when you made the last statement to the Court directly, "I've 
had it" and then repeated that and I find that that is contemptible. I'm not 
finding you in contempt of Court at this time -
(T. 80). Weiskopf thanked the court, and the court continued, 
- but I will not put up with that. I realize these matters are emotional 
and the Court may make correct or incorrect rulings and it's the duty of 
counsel to take the rulings and move on. 
(T. 80). The certification hearing then continued without further incident. 
The court signed minute entries on May 11, 2004, in both juvenile cases reflecting 
that Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous but that the court did not find him in 
contempt (in addendum). They stated, 
...States exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex Espinoza, 
and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received 
into evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in 
recess. The court has had discussion in chambers with counsel. There was 
a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The 
court indicated that it would not re-argue the issues. Mr. Weiskopf got 
upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had it". The court does find Attorney 
Weiskopf s conduct was contemptible, but does not find him in contempt. 
(In addendum). 
On May 21, 2004, after the joint juvenile certification hearing was complete, the 
judge informed Weiskopf that he was changing his mind about not holding him in 
contempt, and would set a sentencing hearing for that (R. 47 at 267). Weiskopf objected, 
stating, 
With respect to that, Your Honor, we may findings on the record 
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before [inaudible] to the contempt and you said you may - your 
determination you did say you find me in contempt, there was no penalty. 
So that is what the record is. I would submit that matter is closed. And for 
the court to reopen it and just say you changed your mind without any new 
findings on the record just appears to be vindictive towards the prosecutor. 
(R. 47 at 269). 
The court entered written contempt findings, which are in the addendum to this 
brief. In these findings, after detailing the facts from his perspective, the court found 
Weiskopf in contempt for a vastly broader range of conduct than he initially found 
contemptuous (Weiskopf s twice telling the judge "I've had it." (T. 80; (in addendum)). 
His ruling stated, 
6. This Court finds Mr. Weiskopf in contempt of court for: 
- repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while it was attempting 
to explain its rulings; 
- violating the Court's order not to argue with the Court's ruling; 
- his behavior in the Court's chambers: continuing to argue with the 
Court, falsely accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry 
statement, "Judge, I've had it. I've had it." These were attempts to get the 
Court to change a prior ruling through verbal intimidation; and 
- falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior, in an attempt to 
cast the Court in a bad light and in an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own 
inappropriate behavior (claiming that the Court was hostile towards the 
State, that the Court had screamed at him before the hearing began, that the 
Court had screamed at him in chambers, and claiming that the Court had 
advanced towards him in an angry manner and screamed at him again). 
The Court finds that this conduct constituted contempt of court 
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-32-1(1) and (2) as disorderly, 
contemptuous, insolent, or boisterous conduct which tended to interrupt the 
due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding, and that, pursuant to Utah 
Code Section 78-32-1(5) he disobeyed the Court's order not to argue with 
or criticize with court rulings once they had been made. 
(R. 17-18). 
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The court recognized that he had originally indicated that he would not hold 
Weiskopf in contempt, but explained that after reflecting on Weiskopf s failure to correct 
his poor behavior in prior cases, decided to invoke the court's contempt powers (R. 18). 
In discussing Weiskopf s past behavior which prompted the contempt citation, the 
court alleged that he had "a pattern of rudely interrupting the court while it is making 
rulings, as well as arguing and criticizing, in a very disrespectful manner, court rulings 
while and after they are made," but the court did not identify any such instances by date 
or case number, or in any other fashion (R. 18). Nor did the court clarify whether some of 
the conduct complained of, such as the criticism of court rulings, occurred outside of the 
court's presence. 
The order directed Weiskopf to appear for sentencing on May 26, 2004 (R. 18). 
On May 25, 2004, Weiskopf moved to continue the sentencing hearing so that he 
could obtain a transcript of the May 11, 2004 hearing, which he had been unable to obtain 
from the court's clerks, as a result of apparent technical difficulties (R. 41). The court 
denied the continuance the same day (R. 40). 
At the outset of the sentencing hearing, Mr. Weiskopf declined to say anything in 
his defense, noting that he did not have an opportunity to review the record to prepare to 
say anything (R. 48 at 2). Before imposing sentence the court complained of Weiskopf s 
misbehavior in other unspecified cases, stating: 
... I note that as was alluded to in my findings that there have been past 
behaviors of inappropriate behavior before this Court, including arguing 
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with opposing counsel, telling opposing counsel to shut up, using profanity 
in court to express anger or frustration as well as interrupting the Court 
while its making findings or explaining its findings in the past, and arguing 
with the Court about rulings which have already been made. The latter two 
are things that were I found occurred in this case, they've also occurred in 
the past. 
Where there has been inappropriate courtroom behavior by an 
attorney, some of the factors important to the Court, of course, besides the 
nature of the behavior which I've addressed in my written findings is 
whether there is a recognition of wrongdoing, whether there's remorse for 
it, whether there's an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the 
behavior, whether there is a plan for avoiding inappropriate behavior in the 
future particularly where it's been a chronic problem or something that has 
been repeated. Also primarily what the Court is after is to have this type of 
behavior cease. 
(R. 48 at 2-3). 
The court then imposed a sentence of thirty days in jail and a fine of $1,000, 
suspending all but two days of the jail time and all but $200 of the fine, conditioned on 
Weiskopf s compliance for a year with standing orders regarding courtroom decorum (R. 
48 at 3-4). 
The court then complimented Weiskopf, indicating that the court liked the work he 
did in the court. The court continued, 
You work your butt off, you care about the kids, and 99 percent of 
the time you're a great attorney. I would like to see that continue for a long 
time. And I know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult to deal 
with, I just have to make those, and I hope you can find a way to make this 
work and keep doing the good things you're doing. 
(R. 48 at 4). 
The court entered a written "Sentence on Contempt of Court" making these 
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additional findings: 
1. Besides the inappropriate behavior which occurred during the 
hearing of May 11, 2004, Mr. Weiskopf has engaged in inappropriate 
behavior in the past, including arguing with opposing counsel; telling 
opposing counsel to "shut up"; using profanity in court to express anger or 
frustration; interrupting the Court while it is making findings or explaining 
findings; and arguing with the Court about rulings which have already been 
made. 
2. In assessing the proper sentence for contempt of court, in addition 
to the seriousness of the conduct, chronicity, and other factors, the Court 
looks at whether there has been a recognition of wrong-doing, an 
expression of remorse, an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the 
inappropriate behavior in the future; none of these were expressed in the 
current case, except that after the Court had orally announced the sentence, 
Mr. Weiskopf did say that he had talked with the people in his office and 
had decided to avoid those behaviors in the future, which was greatly 
appreciated by the Court. 
3. Mr. Weiskopf is a hard-working person who generally 
demonstrates a concern for doing the right thing for juveniles who come to 
juvenile court; this Court has observed those traits in Mr. Weiskopf for 
several years. 
(R. 38). 
At the sentencing hearing referred to by the court, Weiskopf did not agree to 
having a history of misbehavior, but did express his intention to work to please the court 
in the future. His comments at sentencing were as follow: 
Appreciate it, your Honor. And I will, you know. I think myself and 
my office are committed to trying to work with the Court and satisfy the 
Court so hopefully that will - . . . work out to everybody's satisfaction 
down the road. I appreciate your interest that as well. 
(R. 48 at 4-5). 
On June 10, 2004, counsel for Weiskopf filed a motion to reconsider and to stay 
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the sentence imposed pending a hearing (R. 35-37), and on June 11,2004, counsel moved 
the trial court to issue a certificate of probable cause pending appeal (R. 28-30). 
The court denied the motion to reconsider and to stay the sentence on June 10, 
2004, reasoning that his oral statement on May 11 that he was not finding Weiskopf in 
contempt was not final because it was not reduced to writing; that his oral statement only 
indicated that he was not finding Weiskopf in contempt "at that time," that the court was 
not required to find Weiskopf in contempt summarily on May 11; that Weiskopf got more 
notice and time than he was entitled to under the relevant law; and that Weiskopf was not 
entitled to the procedural benefits applicable to cases of indirect contempt, as set forth in 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-10 (R. 33-34). 
All relevant transcript pages and written rulings are in the addendum to this brief. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Our laws govern the issuance of contempt citations in order to insure that the 
public and litigants are not abused by the inherently strong powers of the courts to control 
their courtrooms and the people subject to their jurisdiction. 
Summary criminal contempt powers are antithetical to our country's historical 
traditions of due process of law, and are thus to be used sparingly, in cases wherein 
extreme behavior in the courtroom portends to obstruct the proceedings, and requires 
immediate vindication of the courts9 authority. 
The facts that the judge waited ten days to hold Weiskopf in contempt, and that his 
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ultimate contempt orders referred strictly to conduct which occurred on or before May 11, 
demonstrates that no summary contempt procedures were necessary or properly exercised 
by the juvenile court. 
The misuse of quasi-summary6 contempt powers, ten days after the May 11th 
conduct had occurred, and who knows how long after the unspecified instances in 
Weiskopf s history of allegedly contemptuous behavior had occurred, violated due 
process of law. 
The judge's procedure, in reversing his final orders, in consistently and vaguely 
expanding the range of conduct he initially found contemptuous, in failing to follow the 
contempt statute, in denying Weiskopf an opportunity to defend against the charges, and 
in sentencing Weiskopf before Weiskopf had an opportunity to review the record and 
prepare to defend himself, violated rudimentary principles of due process of law. 
The court's summarily finding Weiskopf in contempt for a history of unspecified 
behavior, which may have involved conduct outside the court's presence, and which was 
at least partially protected by the First Amendment, likewise violated fundamental tenets 
of due process in this criminal case. 
The juvenile court should be bound to the May 11, 2004 order by the doctrines of 
law of the case and res judicata, and by the bar against double jeopardy. 
6Counsel for Weiskopf uses the term quasi-summary to distinguish the juvenile 
court's ultimate contempt citation, which was meted out days after the facts without due 
process, from a true summary contempt proceeding. 
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This Court should reverse the trial court's order finding Weiskopf in contempt. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. 
NO EXERCISE OF 
SUMMARY CONTEMPT POWERS 
WAS JUSTIFIED. 
Contempt is divided into two branches: direct contempt, which is misbehavior 
occurring in the presence of, and obstructing the functioning of, a court, and indirect 
contempt, which is disobedience of a court order outside the court's presence. See, e.g.. 
Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, fflf 27, 20 P.3d 307; Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-
1 (defining various types of contemptuous conduct). 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-3 requires courts to comply with detailed procedures in 
cases of indirect contempt, and permits courts to summarily punish instances of direct 
contempt. It provides, 
When a contempt is committed in the immediate view and presence 
of the court, or judge at chambers, it may be punished summarily, for which 
an order must be made, reciting the facts as occurring in such immediate 
view and presence, adjudging that the person proceeded against is thereby 
guilty of a contempt, and that he be punished as prescribed in Section 78-
32-10 hereof. When the contempt is not committed in the immediate view 
and presence of the court or judge at chambers, an affidavit shall be 
presented to the court or judge of the facts constituting the contempt, or a 
statement of the facts by the referees or arbitrators or other judicial officers. 
The courts' authority to summarily punish contempt which occurs in their presence 
in the courtroom is designed to insure that the justice system is able to function 
appropriately and is not obstructed by obstreperous behavior of people in court. See, e.g.. 
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Pounders v. Watson. 521 U.S. 982, 987-988 (1997). For instance, the first two 
subsections of Utah Code Ann. § 78-32-1, the statute which defines contemptuous 
conduct, provide, 
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or proceedings 
therein are contempts of the authority of the court: 
(1) Disorderly, contemptuous or insolent behavior toward the judge 
while holding the court, tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or 
other judicial proceeding. 
(2) Breach of the peace, boisterous conduct or violent disturbance, 
tending to interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding. 
(Emphasis added). 
Laws governing procedures to be followed in the issuance of contempt orders are 
not designed to protect the judges. Rather, they are designed to protect the public and the 
litigants from the inherently strong and otherwise unchecked powers of the courts to 
control their courtrooms and the people involved in them. See In re McConnell 370 U.S. 
230 (1962) (explaining that the federal contempt laws were enacted in 1831 to correct 
"serious abuses" by the courts and to protect constitutional procedures). See also, 
Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, 259 (Utah 1947) (the 
purpose of the contempt laws is not to protect judges as individuals; their "purpose is to 
protect litigants and the public from the mischievous danger of an unfree and coerced 
tribunal"). 
Because they are antithetical to our traditions of procedural due process, summary 
contempt proceedings must be limited, and are normally reserved for misconduct in open 
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courtrooms, where the court's dignity is openly affronted in public, where disruption of 
ongoing proceedings is threatened, and where the circumstances thus require more 
immediate vindication of the court's authority. See, generally, e.g.. Pounders v. Watson. 
521 U.S. 982, 988-991 (1997). 
Trial judges must use great restraint in exercising summary contempt powers. See. 
InreMcConnelL 370 U.S. 230, 234 (1962). The Supreme Court has held that federal 
courts must exercise the least contempt powers necessary to maintain order, lest they 
encroach on the Bill of Rights. Id. In interpreting the federal contempt statute, the Court 
has required proof of actual obstruction of justice to justify summary contempt 
proceedings. Id. 
Particularly in cases where the alleged condemner is a lawyer actively representing 
a client, summary contempt powers should be used very sparingly. As the Court 
explained in McConnell. 
While we appreciate the necessity for a judge to have the power to 
protect himself from actual obstruction in the courtroom, or even from 
conduct so near to the court as actually to obstruct justice, it is also essential 
to a fair administration of justice that lawyers be able to make honest good-
faith efforts to present their clients' cases. An independent judiciary and a 
vigorous, independent bar are both indispensable parts of our system of 
justice. 
Id. at 236. 
In McConnell. a lawyer was trying to make a proffer of questions necessary to 
preserve his client's position on appeal, and when the judge tried to stop the lawyer, the 
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lawyer asserted that he would continue to ask the necessary questions until removed from 
the courtroom by the bailiffs. After a recess, the lawyer asked no further questions and 
the trial continued without incident Id. at 235-36. On these facts, the Court found that 
the exercise of summary contempt powers under the federal statute was not warranted, 
explaining, 'The arguments of a lawyer in presenting his client's case strenuously and 
persistently cannot amount to a contempt of court so long as the lawyer does not in some 
way create an obstruction which blocks the judge in the performance of his judicial duty." 
Id. at 236. 
In the instant matter, the court initially found Weiskopf s twice saying to him in 
chambers "I've had it" after referring to the court's twice "screaming" at him 
"contemptible," but expressly opted not to find Weiskopf in contempt (T. 80), until he 
reversed himself and held him in contempt ten days later. 
The exercise of summary contempt powers was not justified, because Weiskopf s 
informing the court in chambers that he could not tolerate the judge's raising his voice at 
him7 did nothing to block the juvenile proceedings from going forward. Nor did 
Weiskopf s attempts to inform the court of the relevant law, or to clarify how the court's 
ruling would apply to similar evidence in the remainder of the proceedings. Compare 
McConnell supra. 
The fact that the exercise of summary contempt powers was not justified is most 
7The judge did concede that he raised his voice once in chambers (T. 79). 
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clearly demonstrated by the fact that the judge so recognized during the hearing on May 
11, 2004, when he informed Weiskopf that he would not hold him in contempt and signed 
two written orders to this effect (T. 80, addendum), and proceeded to complete the 
hearing on the 1 ltht, and only decided to hold him in contempt ten days later at the 
conclusion of a two day certification hearing, which involved no misbehavior by 
Weiskopf after the judge said he would not hold him in contempt on the 11th (e.g. R. 47 
at 267). The contempt citation did nothing to facilitate a blocked judicial proceeding, or 
to immediately vindicate the publicly disobeyed orders of a court, and was neither 
justified as, nor imposed as, a true summary contempt citation. See, e.g.. Pounders v. 
Watson, supra. 
The juvenile court's bootstrapping of Weiskopf s allegedly contemptuous past 
behavior that was unidentified by case number, date, or specific incident (e.g. R. 17-18), 
does nothing to establish that Weiskopf did anything to obstruct the proceedings on May 
11, 2004, or on any other day, to justify the exercise of summary contempt powers. See 
McConnelL supra. Rather, it reflects that the judge decided on May 21, 2004, that he 
wanted to change some of the norms of behavior that had been permitted and prevailed in 
his courtroom for years, as Weiskopf had been "working his butt off," being a "great 
lawyer" "ninety-nine percent of the time," caring about the juveniles coming through the 
courtroom, and effectively representing his client (R. 38, R. 48 at 4). The misuse of 
summary contempt powers to reach this end was flagrantly inappropriate and an abuse of 
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due process. See McConnell, supra. 
Because the juvenile court's invocation of summary contempt powers was neither 
legally justified nor properly executed, this Court should reverse the juvenile court's 
orders finding Weiskopf in contempt. 
II. 
THE COURT DENIED WEISKOPF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
IN THIS CRIMINAL CASE. 
The courts of this State exercise two distinct types of contempt powers: 
civil contempt, which is remedial and designed to persuade a party to comply with a court 
order, and criminal contempt, which is designed to punish disobedience of a court order, 
to vindicate the court's authority. See generally, e.g.. Foreman v. Foreman, 176 P.2d 165, 
168-69 (Utah 1947). It is a court's purpose in imposing a contempt order that determines 
whether the contempt is properly classified as civil or criminal, for both types of contempt 
may involve fines or imprisonment. See, e.g.. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 
1168-69 (Utah 1988). If a court intends to vindicate its authority, the contempt is 
generally viewed as criminal, whereas if a court intends to act in remedial fashion, the 
contempt is generally viewed as civil. See id. When a condemner is able to purge 
himself of the consequences of his contempt by complying with a court order, the 
contempt is generally viewed as civil. Id. and n.5. When a condemner must serve a fixed 
sentence, and pay fines to the court, rather than to a party, the contempt is viewed as 
criminal. Id. 
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Because two days of Weiskopf s jail sentence and two hundred dollars of 
Weiskopf s fine paid to the court were not suspended, at least that part of the contempt in 
this case is properly viewed as criminal. See id. 
Every criminal defendant has several related federal constitutional rights to present 
a complete defense to criminal charges against him. See Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 
683 (1985)(M Whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, or in the Compulsory Process of confrontation clauses of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants 'a meaningful opportunity 
to present a complete defense.1... We break no new ground in observing that an essential 
component of procedural fairness is an opportunity to be heard.,!)(citations omitted). 
The Constitution of Utah provides parallel protection. An essential element of due 
process provided by article I section 7 of the Utah Constitution is the "fair opportunity to 
submit evidence." Christiansen v. Harris, 163 P.2d 314, 317 (Utah 1945). "[T]he 
defendant's right to present all competent evidence in his defense is a right guaranteed by 
the due process clause of our State Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 7[.]" State v. Harding, 635 
P.2d 33, 34 (Utah 1981). 
Article I section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides numerous trial rights which 
also pertain. It states, 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, 
to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process 
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to compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy 
public trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense 
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. 
(Emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-1-6 similarly provides, 
(1) In criminal prosecutions the defendant is entitled: 
(a) To appear in person and defend in person or by counsel; 
(c) To testify in his own behalf; 
(e) To have compulsory process to insure the attendance of witnesses in his behalf^.] 
Under the Utah and Federal Constitutional Due Process Clauses, Article I § 7 and 
the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, a person facing charges of criminal contempt, 
whether direct or indirect, is entitled to notice, counsel, confrontation and the an 
opportunity to present a defense. See, e.g.. Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322 
(Utah 1982) (per curiam); Crank v. Utah Judicial Council 2001 UT 8, ffif 26-27, 20 P.3d 
307. As the court explained in Powers v. Tavlor. 378 P.2d 519 (Utah 1963), 
The essence of contempt of court is the wilful disregard or 
disobedience of its orders. Inasmuch as it is punishable by the traditional 
criminal sanctions of fine and imprisonment, it partakes of the nature of 
criminal proceedings and is sometimes referred to as quasi-criminal. 
Because of this it is essential that the rights of one so accused be carefully 
safeguarded. He must be apprised of the nature of the accusation; afforded 
an opportunity to meet it; and in order to justify a finding and sentence for 
contempt the proof should be clear and satisfactory that the contemner was 
in violation or defiance of the court's order. When this is done it is 
necessary for the court to make written findings upon the specific conduct 
found to be contemptuous, and draw its conclusions and enter judgment 
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thereon. 
Id. at 520 (footnotes containing citations omitted). 
To sustain a criminal contempt citation, there must be proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt. Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162,1172 (Utah 1988). When the contempt is 
based on disobedience of a court order, there must be proof that the defendant knew he 
was under the order, that he had the ability to comply with it, and that he intentionally did 
not. See id. 
Criminal contempt cases normally involve the use of an order to show cause. See, 
Shipman v. Evans, 2004 UT 44, ^  41, 100 P.3d 1151 (trial court's initiating contempt 
proceedings with order to show cause evinced intent to exercise criminal contempt 
powers). 
Cases involving indirect contempt, or contempt occurring outside the presence of a 
court, whether civil or criminal, require the use of an affidavit detailing the alleged 
contempt, and an order to show cause, followed by contempt proceedings. See Crank, 
supra, 2001 UT 8 at fflf 27-28. 
In the instant matter, the trial court ultimately punished Weiskopf for contempt on 
the basis of a history of conduct, without specifying whether all the conduct occurred in 
court, or outside the court's presence (R. 18, 38, R. 48 at 2-3). 
Assuming arguendo that any of Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous, if it 
occurred outside the court's presence, Weiskopf was entitled to the full procedural 
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protections of the affidavit and order to show cause for indirect contempt. See Crank, 
supra. 
Assuming arguendo that any of Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous, if it 
occurred in the court's presence, he was entitled to notice, counsel, confrontation and a 
chance to defend himself. See, Crank, Burgers, and Powers supra. 
The court denied Weiskopf all of the foregoing procedural rights, in citing 
Weiskopf for contempt (R. 17-18) after expressly informing him that he would not (T. 80, 
May 11, 2004 orders, in addendum), in giving Weiskopf no opportunity to defend himself 
before informing him that he was in contempt after all, and in denying him a continuance 
so he could prepare to defend himself at the sentencing hearing (R. 40). But see Crank, 
Burgers, and Powers, supra. 
The fact that part of the juvenile court's basis for holding Weiskopf in contempt 
was Weiskopf s criticism of past court rulings (R. 17-18) demonstrates the lawless nature 
of the contempt citation, for criticism of past court rulings has been well-recognized 
constitutionally protected speech for years, and does not support a contempt citation. 
See, e.g., Robinson v. City Court for the City of Ogden, 185 P.2d 256, 257 (Utah 1947) 
("The rule announced by the Supreme Court of the United States and by this court is that 
criticism after final disposition of an action is the exercise of the right of free speech and 
therefore not contemptuous.") (Citations omitted). 
Because the juvenile court's contempt proceedings denied Weiskopf due process 
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of law and several related constitutional rights, this Court should reverse the juvenile 
court's contempt orders. 
III. 
THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE 
SHOULD BE BOUND BY HIS MAY 11, 2004 RULING 
THAT WEISKOPF WOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT. 
The court signed minute entries on May 11, 2004, in both juvenile cases reflecting 
that Weiskopf s conduct was contemptuous but that the court did not find him in 
contempt (in addendum). They stated, 
...States exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex Espinoza, 
and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received 
into evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in 
recess. The court has had discussion in chambers with counsel. There was 
a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The 
court indicated that it would not re-argue the issues. Mr. Weiskopf got 
upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had it". The court does find Attorney 
Weiskopf s conduct was contemptible, but does not find him in contempt. 
(In addendum). 
While the juvenile court's ruling denying the motion to consider (R. 33) accurately 
quotes the court's language at the May 11 hearing, that he opted not to find Weiskopf in 
contempt "at this time" (T. 80), the ruling denying the motion to reconsider is clearly 
erroneous in indicating that the order that he would not find Weiskopf in contempt was 
not final because it was not reduced to writing (R. 33). 
Because this finding of fact is phrased in the negative, there is no evidence to 
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marshal in support of it. The two signed orders in the juveniles' cases which reflect that 
the court would not hold Weiskopf in contempt for the May 11 conduct conclusively 
disprove the court's finding that there was no final order reduced to writing, which is 
clearly erroneous. 
In entering final orders effectively acquitting Weiskopf of contempt on May 11, 
2004, and in later holding Weiskopf in contempt for the very same conduct on May 21, 
2004, the juvenile court violated the law of the case doctrine. The law of the case 
doctrine generally holds that courts will not revisit decided issues, and is designed to 
protect the courts and the parties from repeated claims and the attendant waste of judicial 
resources. See, e ^ , Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034, 1038-39 (Utah 1995). 
There are three circumstances which justify deviation from the law of the case 
been an intervening change of controlling authority; (2) 
s has become available; or (3) when the court is 
>rior decision was clearly erroneous and would work a 
8In addressing this factual error, counsel for Weiskopf acknowledges his duty to 
marshal the evidence in support of each finding, and to view it in the light most favorable 
to the trial court. See, e ^ , Wilson Supply Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 2002 UT 94,121, 
54P.3d 1177. 
In pointing out the complete absence of evidence to marshal in support of this 
finding, counsel does not shirk his duty to marshal, but casts upon the Appellee the 
burden of identifying one scintilla of evidence that supports the challenged finding. See, 
id. at f 22. 
30 
Id. at 1039. 
None of the exceptions to the law of the case doctrine are present in the instant 
case, where there is no record whatsoever of any misconduct or other change of 
circumstances or law since the May 11, 2004 ruling that Weiskopf would not be found in 
contempt. Holding Weiskopf in contempt was not necessary to prevent a manifest 
injustice, but rather, constituted one. See Points I and II of this brief, supra. 
The court's re-visitation of the contempt issue was likewise barred by the doctrine 
of res judicata. Res judicata, which is divided into two branches, issue preclusion (also 
known as collateral estoppel) and claim preclusion, precludes re-litigation of previously 
decided issues. See, e.g.. Penrod v. Nu Creation Creme. Inc.. 669 P.2d 873, 874-75 (Utah 
1983). The doctrine is premised on efficiency and economy in requiring issues to be 
resolved only once and with finality. See, e.g.. Salt Lake Citizens Congress v. Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph. 846 P.2d 1245, 1251 (Utah 1992). 
The claim preclusion branch of res judicata focuses on the cause of action litigated 
between the parties or their privies, and generally forbids re-litigation of issues in a 
subsequent action which were or could have been litigated in a prior action. See, e.g.. 
Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com'n. 2001 UT 74, Tj 22, 34 P.3d 180. 
The issue preclusion or collateral estoppel branch of res judicata involves different 
causes of action, but prevents parties or privies from re-litigating facts and issues resolved 
in prior actions. See, id. 
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To invoke the doctrine of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel, a party must 
establish four elements: 
(1) the issue decided in the prior adjudication is identical to the one 
presented in the instant action; (2) the party against whom issue preclusion 
is asserted was a party, or in privity with a party, to the prior adjudication; 
(3) the issue in the first action was completely, folly, and fairly litigated; 
and (4) the first suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Bucknerv.Kennard, 2004 UT 78, f 13, 2004 WL 2072540. 
To establish claim preclusion, a party must establish three elements: 
First, both cases must involve the same parties or their privies. Second, the 
claim that is alleged to be barred must have been presented in the first suit 
or must be one that could and should have been raised in the first action. 
Third, the first suit must have resulted in a final judgment on the merits. 
Youren v. Tintic School District, 2004 UT App 33, f 2, 86 P.3d 771. 
In the instant matter, the issue and claim of Weiskopf s contempt was conclusively 
and finally resolved in the final written orders of May 11, 2004, entered by Judge Andrus 
and holding that Weiskopf would not be held in contempt. The judge had all the relevant 
information on May 11th that he relied on in imposing the contempt order on May 21st, 
and should not be heard to complain of any procedural unfairness to him in the May 11th 
proceeding. Thus, the May 21st contempt order should be viewed as barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. See, e.g.. Mountain States Telephone, supra. 
Particularly because the order at issue is a criminal sentence, the May 21st order 
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should be stricken, because it conflicts with the constitutional and related statutory bars 
against double jeopardy. 
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I § 12 of the 
Utah Constitution both contain Double Jeopardy Clauses, which provide "a fundamental 
right which prevents a defendant from being tried more than once for the same crime." 
State v. Straden 902 P.2d 638, 642 (Utah App.), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (1996). 
Similar but broader protection is provided by Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, which 
provides, in relevant part: 
(1) If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses 
arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the 
same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is 
barred if: 
(a) The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that 
was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402(2) 
in the former prosecution; and 
(b) The former prosecution: 
(I) resulted in acquittal; or 
(ii) resulted in conviction; or 
(iv) was terminated by a final order or 
judgment for the defendant that has not been 
reversed, set aside, or vacated and that 
necessarily required a determination 
inconsistent with a fact that must be established 
to secure conviction in the subsequent 
prosecution. 
(2) There is an acquittal if the prosecution resulted in a finding of not 
guilty by the trier of facts or in a determination that there was insufficient 
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evidence to warrant conviction.... 
(3) There is a conviction if the prosecution resulted in a judgment of 
guilt that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated; a verdict of guilty that 
has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and that is capable of supporting 
a judgment; or a plea of guilty accepted by the court. 
For purposes of double jeopardy, a judge need not label a ruling as an acquittal for 
it to operate as one; if the judge makes a factual finding favoring the defendant on one or 
more elements of a criminal offense, this operates as an acquittal. See, e.g.. Salt Lake 
City v.Roberts, 2003 UT App 271,12, 76 P.3d 213. 
In the instant matter, the judge's May 11 2004 order finding Weiskopf s conduct 
"contemptible" but opting not to hold him in contempt can be viewed as an acquittal, 
because the judge signed final orders expressly not holding Weiskopf in contempt, and 
imposed no sentence for contempt. His ruling, finding that Weiskopf would not be held 
in contempt, favors Weiskopf on all elements of a contempt charge, and thus constitutes 
an acquittal under Roberts. 
Alternatively, the judge's finding that Weiskopf s conduct was "contemptible" 
might also be viewed as a conviction for which the judge opted to impose a sentence 
involving no punishment. If so, the judge nonetheless had no business retrying Weiskopf 
for that offense after entering a conviction. See, e.g., Strader, 76-1-403(3), supra. 
Compare State v. Wright 904 P.2d 1101, 1102 (Utah 1995) (trial court's final written 
order imposing a more severe sentence than non-final oral comments did not violate 
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double jeopardy). 
Finally, the judge's finding his conduct "contemptible," followed by his final 
written orders that he would not find Weiskopf guilty of contempt might be construed as a 
termination by a final order determining a fact inconsistent with the subsequent 
prosecution, under 76-1-403 (l)(b)(iv), supra. 
Because the judge's orders finding Weiskopf in contempt violated the law of the 
case, res judicata and double jeopardy doctrines, this Court should reverse those orders. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the district court's orders finding Weiskopf in contempt. 
Respectfully submitted this ^«3*"dav ofc)ec^mV» »o/v 2004. 
\>AM~& 
D. Gilbert Athay 
Counsel for Mr. Weiskopf 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the foregoing, first 
class postage pre-paid to Brent M. Johnson, Administrative Office of the Courts, Legal 
Department, 450 South State Street, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0241 this <p^ 
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preliminary hearing part of this was waived. This is a 
certification hearing. State v. DNZ talks about reports that 
are required, at least at the time and I think still are 
required to be submitted by statute. 
MR. WEISKOPF: And other materials. It specifically 
says written reports and other materials - and other materials 
I would highlight, citing the statute 78-3A-6035 and the court 
can say it's not a preliminary hearing but the expressed 
specific language of the statute, 78-3A-6032, if the Court 
would refer itself to the statute, says that it is a 
preliminary hearing and that it has subparagraph A or 1 for 
probably cause and 2 or B for the certification factors. 
That's the statutory definition. 
THE COURT: Okay, I've made my ruling. 
MR. WEISKOPF: All right. The State denotes that in 
stark contrast and plain language and the definition in the 
code and the Court has already shown hostility toward 
prosecution and we wonder why they're trying to keep evidence 
out that's clearly provided for in the law. 
THE COURT: Mr. Weiskopf, your statements are 
inappropriate. The next time that you argue with my rulings 
after I've made a ruling, I will find you in contempt of court. 
I'm directing you not to do that— 
MR. WEISKOPF: We'd ask to be allowed (inaudible) an 


































THE COURT: Denied. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Would you - can we have a recess to 
Detective Scott? 
THE COURT: Yes. Let's take about a 10 minute break. 
MR. WEISKOPF: So you're saying we need to present 
Espinoza? 
THE COURT: I've made my ruling on the - I've denied-! 
MR. WEISKOPF: We'd ask for a continuance since the | 
gave us this new slant on what a certification — 
THE COURT: I'm taking a 10-minute break, so let's 
a break. 
(Whereupon a recess was taken) 
THE COURT: Are we on the record? 
COURT CLERK: We're waiting for the juveniles, Your 
THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to make a record of a 
discussion that we had in chambers just a few moments ago. 
Counsel had requested to speak with the Court in chambers and 
had the attorneys, Mr. Weiskopf for the State, Ms. Sipes for 
Jeffrey Ortega, and Ms. Clark for Javier Cisneros in my 
chambers. There was a question raised by Mr. Weiskopf 
regarding the ruling the Court had just made and how it might 
impact future evidence that he intends to offer and after 















































chambers and Mr. 
I repeated that 
\ there and he started 
bringing it up again and then I raised my voice and said I'm 
not going to argue it at this point. He then turned to me and 
said, "I haven't screamed at you, Judge, but you've now 
screamed at me twice," and then he said, "Judge, I've had it." 
And then he repeated, "I've had it" addressing those remarks to 
the Court. 
First I want to know if any of the counsel dispute 
that as an accurate statement of what happened in chambers? 
MR. WEISKOPF: The State does, Your Honor. 
MS. SIPES: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: You may put your statement on the record 
of your version. 
MR. WEISKOPF: That when I brought up the issue of 
similar evidence, you said that we were free to try and work 
out a stipulation but you weren't going to rehear an argument 
which recognized that we were doing more than really hearing an 
argument. I was trying to address with counsel and the Court 
an arrangement with respect to a similar kind of evidence. So 
it wasn't my just directing re-argument toward you and you 
specifically acknowledged that by addressing that I was 
bringing up a new issue of evidence that could be spoken about 
and then you characterized it as arguing and kept saying you 
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1 weren't going to reargue, the two times like you said and then 
2 I tried to bring your attention back to this and you screamed 
3 at me and then you got up and approached me in an angry manner 
4 and continued to scream at me and then I turned at you and said 
5 I "You've screamed at me twice today, the other time being when 
6 the defense counsel was almost an hour late and I simply said I 
7 want to make a record that this is not fair, I'm unhappy. I do 
8 not recall - does anyone recall being told this hearing may be 
9 delayed? It's not fair to the witnesses, it's not fair to the 
10 victim." And you screamed at me, "Well, what am I suppose to 
11 do about it" or something like that. 
12 THE COURT: Ms. Clark. 
13 MS. CLARK: I was present at that initial hearing 
14 when (inaudible) we just came in and we were discussing the 
15 time of the hearing and Mr. Weiskopf said he was just 
16 concerned, he wasn't going to ask for sanctions, he just had a 
17 concern that there was the delay. There was no screaming by 
18 the bench. All the Judge said is, "Yes, it may be unfair but, 
19 you know, what can I do about it?" That was it. 
20 MR. WEISKOPF: I believe there's a tape of that. 
21 MS. CLARK: In the chambers there was no screaming by 
22 ' the Judge. There was a time when the Judge, as indicated, 
23 raised his voice but there was no - I heard no screaming, nor 
24 did I see the Judge go toward - I mean he was walking out as we 
25 J all walking out but I didn't see any movement by Judge Andrus 
7 3 
1 toward Mr. Weiskopf. 
2 I MR. WEISKOPF: Does the Judge deny he was approaching 
3 me directly as we were leaving the chambers? 
4 | THE COURT: I did not scream at you at all today 
5 either on the prior incident or the incident in my office. I 
6 did raise my voice once at you after I had twice told you that 
7 I was not going to reargue the matter and told you that you 
8 could talk that over with counsel and see if you could 
9 J stipulate something but that I was not going to reargue my 
10 ruling. I did walk toward you as everyone was leaving the room 
11 I and as I was headed in the direction as well, but I was not 
12 approaching you in an angry manner. 
13 MS. SIPES: Your Honor, may I just state that it was 
14 my fault and I acknowledged that it was my fault that there was 
15 a delay in the trial starting today. I had a matter in the 
16 district court that went longer than I had anticipated and I 
17 apologized for that. I apologized to Mr. Weiskopf and to his 
18 witnesses and the people he brought along with him. 
19 I, as well, was present during that hearing. The 
20 second incident that we were talking about in chambers, I don't 
21 know how the Court could have gotten out of the room without 
22 walking around its desk. Mr. Weiskopf, what I saw was standing 
23 to the side of the desk that the Court had to walk around in 
24 order to get out of the room and I certainly would not 
25 characterize the Court's actions as going towards or leading 
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1 towards Mr. Weiskopf or screaming or yelling at him. 
2 | THE COURT: Now, I'm going to warn you again, Mr. 
3 Weiskopf, it was very inappropriate when you made the last 
4 statement to the Court directly, "I've had it" and then {Jy 
5 repeated that and I find that that is contemptible. I'm not 
6 finding you in contempt of Court at this time -
7 I MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: - but I just will not put up with that. 
9 I realize these matters are emotional and the Court may make 
10 correct or incorrect rulings and it's the duty of counsel to 
11 take the rulings and move on. 
12 MR. WEISKOPF: Fine. It does pose a problem though 
13 to the State. Can we talk about scheduling here? It's 3:15. 
14 THE COURT: Let's do this. Let's finish the evidence 
15 and then if we haven't - we may need to continue this to 
16 another date anyways to finish the evidence. If we don't, then 
17 we'll address that again. 
18 MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you. I did take back the 
19 statement that you declined, for which you sustained the 
20 objection. 
21 Q (BY MR. WEISKOPF) So, Detective Gent returning to 
22 our examination, did you learn the names of any suspects in the 
23 assault on the fallen person, upon the person identified as 
24 Santiago (inaudible) Vasquez? 
25 A During the investigation we spoke to numerous 
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MAY 11 MINUTE ENTRIES 
STATCOPttoOn 
Juvenile Court l 
SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE CObuT # 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, ST Ait Vfc&Ff&PW*? CfeA of the tarife Cfcst rf At 
"~ ~ ~ — ~-""l henfyt^ty that Oft s # l » l ^ 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of i MINlWBftp &m*im&ti^kmmmwi&****$** 
! full mje and contct copy ftertdt 
! WrVED^BS&MSaSBkl tat 1 
C W E M t t . J M . | ^ r f ^ ^ ; , ^ 
A person under 18 years of age { p t t & b ^ ^ V^lfi fflrtrtiai 
Present' Javier Cisncros, minor; Consuda Jimmcz, mother; Luther Gaylord, uucrpreter; 
Jennifer Clark, attorney for minor; David Weiskopf and Tricia Smedley, deputy county attorney; 
witnesses; and Kenny Ala, probation officer 
The above entitled matter having come before this court for the puipose of arraignment on 
incident 037, fake alarm, contained m the petition dated March 22, 2004 and for hearing on incident 
041, attempted murder, contained in the information dated March 15, 2004 and incidctil 042 motion to 
certify dated March 15, 
Attorney Sipes and Attorney Clark ask that Mr. Guerster, a reporter, be asked to leave. 
Motion is denied. Mr. Guerster is asked not tn use names in his article, All witnesses arc sworn. The 
exclusionary rule is invoked. Jessica Tapia testifies for the state. States exhibit A is marked, identified 
as a picture of the victim, and received into evidence, Jario Guiternez is sworn and testifies for the 
state. States Exhibit B is marked, identified as his statement given to the police, and received in to 
evidence. States Exhibit C is marked identified as a metal barbell, and received into evidence. 
Detective Jim Dent testifies for the state. States Exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from 
Alex Espinoza, and is not offered into evidence, counsel object The exhibit is not received into 
evidence. Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in recess. The court has had discussion 
in chambers with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had 
made. The court indicated that it would not re-argue the issue. Mr. Weiskopf got uPse^efl£2l£ng 
Tve had it" "I've had it". The court indicates that it finds Mr. Weiskopf s conduct<f^S^m^but 
do»not find him in contempt Detective Dent continues his testimony, States Exhibit E is manied, 
idenriflcd as a statement from Javier Cisneros, and is admitted into evidence. Stales Exhibit F and C 
are marked as pictures of the barbell, and are admitted into evidence. Detective Tim Scott is sworn in 
and testifies for the state. States Exhibit FI is marked, identified as a statement given by Jeffery Ortega, 
and is received into evidence. Attorney Stpes objects to the admission of Exhibit B - overuled. Shara 
Gooda testifies for the state, Scott Peterson testifies for the state. John Zizumbo is sworn and testifies 
for the state. States Exhibit I is marked, identified as daily logs of activity tor Jeff Orgega from Weber 
Valley Detention Center, and is received into evidence. Patrick Gooley is sworn and testifies for the 
state. 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: This matter is continued to May 
21, 2004 at 11,00 a.m. for further certification hearing. The above minor is continued in detention 
pending said hearing, 
Dated May 11,2004 
Failure to comply with the above order will result in your being found in contempt of court, the low of your 
Driver's License, and/or forfeiture of any or alt of your Utah State Income Tax refund. 
You have a right to appeal this matter lo the Utah Court of Appeals, Appeal must be fil^4^ffriinr5Q^ay.s 
from this date. 
BY TTTE COURT. / ,« , ^ T ^ vV* \ . 
CC Parent (x)DT(x)KJA ; i j . - .
 c - - _ - * • - & 
SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COU*f 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
ORTEGA, Jeffrey 
A person under 18 years of age 
MINUTES, FINDINGS AND ORDER 
Case Number:935953 
CD:13; 1:08; R:3 PL 
Present: Jeffrey Ortega, minor; Rosaiva Uribc, mother; Sharon Sipes, attorney for minor; 
Cristina Bernal, interpreter; David Weiskopf and Tricia Smedley, deputy county attorney; witnesses; and 
Kenny Ala probation officer 
The above entitled matter having come before this court for the purpose of arraignment on 
incident Oil, contempt, contained in the affidavit dated February 24, 2004, and for hearing on incident 
017, attempted murder, contained in the information dated March 17» 2004 and incident 042 motion to 
certify dated March 17, 2004. 
Attorney Sipes and Attorney Ciark ask that Mr. Guerster, a reporter, be asked to leave. Motion 
is denied. Mr. Guerster is asked not to use names in his article. All witnesses are sworn. The 
exclusionary rule is invoked. Jessica Tapia testifies for the state. States exhibit A is marked, identified 
as a picture of the victim, and received into evidence, Jario Guiterriez is sworn and testifies for the 
state, States Exhibit B is marked, identified as his statement given to the police, and received in to 
evidence. States Exhibit C is marked identified as a metal barbell, and received into evidence. 
Detective Jim Dent testifies for the state. States Exhibit D is marked, identified as a statement from Alex 
Kspinoza, and is not offered into evidence, counsel object. The exhibit is not received into evidence, 
Attorney Weiskopf asks for a continuance. Court is in recess. The court has had discussion in chambers 
with counsel. There was a question by Mr. Weiskopf regarding the ruling the court had made. The court 
indicated (hat it would not re-arguc the issue, Mr. Weiskopf got upset repeating "I've had it" "I've had 
it". The court does find Attorney Weiskopf s conduct was contemptablc, but docs not find him in 
contempt, Detective Dent continues his testimony. States Exhibit E is marked, identified as a statement 
from Javier Cisneros, and is admitted into evidence. States Exhibit F and G are marked as pictures of 
the barbell, and are admitted into evidence, Detective Tim Scott is sworn in and testifies for the 
state. States Exhibit II is marked, identified as a statement given by Jeffery Ortega, and is received into 
evidence. Attorney Sipes objects to the admission of Exhibit B - overuled. Shara Gooda testifies for the 
state, Scott Peterson testifies for the state. John Zizumbo is sworn and testifies for the state. States 
Exhibit I is marked, identified as daily logs of activity for Jeff Orgega from Weber Valley Detention 
Center, and is received into evidence. Patrick Gooley is sworn and testifies for the state. 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED, that: This matter is continued to May 21, 
2004 at 8:00 a.m. for furtherccrtification hearing. The above minor is continued in detention pending 
iuveafc Coat J * 
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1 (Whereupon a recess was taken) 
2 THE COURT: We're back on the record. What did we 
3 decide about closing arguments? 
4 I MS. SIPES: I think we decided to go ahead and 
5 proceed, Your Honor. 
6 MR. WEISKOPF: I don't know if 40 minutes is going to 
7 be enough time though, Your Honor. 
8 THE COURT: Okay, if it's not enough time, let's set 
9 it over to another day. 
10 MR. WEISKOPF: I think that would be advisable. 
11 THE COURT: Somewhere we've got maybe an hour and a 
12 I half, two hours. 
13 While she's getting that date, I have regarding my 
14 ruling on May 11th when we were here last time, Mr. Weiskopf, 
15 where I decided not to find you in contempt of court I changed 
16 my mind. I am finding you in contempt of court for that. I 
17 want to set a sentencing date for that as well. 
18 MR. WEISKOPF: Is there any reason you changed your 
19 mind? 
20 THE COURT: Yes. I'll explain that and I'll make 
21 written detailed findings and explain that. 
22 i MS. CLARK: How much time are we looking for? Do we 
23 have an idea? 
24 THE COURT: I'm thinking an hour and a half to two 
25 hours. 
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1 MS. CLARK: Okay, thank you. 
2 COURT CLERK: We're going to be gone -
3 MR. WEISKOPF: [inaudible] and I have trial Thursday 
4 afternoon [inaudible]. 
5 THE COURT: Would that work for -
6 MS. CLARK: What was the date, Your Honor, I 
7 apologize. 
8 I THE COURT: June 1st, Tuesday. 
9 MS. CLARK: At what time? 
10 COURT CLERK: 1:45. 
11 MR. WEISKOPF: I'm sorry. 
12 COURT CLERK: 1:45. 
13 MS. CLARK: Sure. 
14 MS. SIPES: I have two reviews. My guess is -
15 MS. CLARK: I have shelters, but that doesn't start 
16 until 3:00. So I can do -
17 MS. SIPES: And my reviews I can maybe - I was 
18 thinking I can handle it but it's going to be hard to find 
19 time. But just so the court knows I have two of these I have 
20 to deal with somehow. 
21 THE COURT: Are they before or after? 
22 MS. SIPES: 1:30 and 2:30. You know what, the 2:30 
23 one it's actually just the 1:30. What time are you looking at 
24 setting? 1:30? 
25 THE COURT: 1:45. 
2 6S 
1 MS. SIPES: So that may work. I could just fly down 
2 and do that other review and - and maybe I can get someone to 
3 cover it. I know Gary Barson [inaudible]. So that will be 
4 fine. 
5 j THE COURT: Okay, June 1st at 1:45 we will conclude 
6 this case and do closing arguments then. 
7 Get a setting for the sentencing on the contempt. 
8 MR. WEISKOPF: With respect to that, Your Honor, we 
9 may findings on the record before [inaudible] to the contempt 
10 and you said you may - your determination you did say you did 
11 find me in contempt, there was no penalty. So that is what the 
12 record is. I would submit that matter is closed. And for the 
13 court to reopen it and just say you changed your mind without 
14 any new findings on the record just appears to be vindictive 
15 towards the prosecutor. 
16 THE COURT: What date can we set that disposition? 
17 COURT CLERK: [inaudible] 
18 MR. WEISKOPF: But I'm formally objecting to it. 
19 You've already made your disposition. 
20 MS. CLARK: Your Honor, is that something that we're 
21 supposed to be here? 
22 THE COURT: You don't need to be. 
23 MS. CLARK: Thank you. 
24 THE COURT: May 26th at 9:00 will be the sentencing 
25 on the contempt. Okay, that'll be all for now. 
269 
1 MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you. 
2 MS. CLARK: Thank you, Your Honor, 
3 MS. SIPES: Thank you. 























ORDER HOLDING WEISKOPF IN CONTEMPT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF CONTEMPT FINDINGS 
DAVID WEISKOPF, 
Case No 444959 
A person over 18 years of age. 
David Weiskopf, as a Deputy County Attorney for the Weber County Attorney's Office, 
appeared representing the State of Utah in a hearing held May 11, 2004, on the State's motions 
requesting that two separate juveniles be certified to stand trial in district court (Case Nos. 
135570 and 935953, respectively). Also appearing were, the two juveniles whose cases were at 
bar; parents of the juveniles; Jennifer Clark, attorney for one of the juveniles; Sharon Sipes, 
attorney for the other juvenile; and Patricia Smedley, another Deputy County Attorney appearing 
"for the Stater At one point during the trial, the Court made oral findings regarding behavior of 
Mr. Weiskopf, indicating that the behavior was worthy of contempt of court, but that the Court 
would not make a formal finding of contempt at that time; having not previously made a final 
order upon the matter, and upon further reflection and consideration of the matter, the Court 
hereby issues a formal finding of contempt of court by Mr. Weiskopf 
FINDINGS 
1. The hearing was scheduled to begin at 11:00 a.m., but Ms. Sipes, attorney for one of 
the juveniles, was detained in district court on another matter; at noon, Ms. Clark, Mr. Weiskopf, 
and Ms. Smedley, came into the courtroom to discuss the situation; Ms. Clark explained that Ms. 
Sipes was still in district court and would still be a few minutes; Mr. Weiskopf then said Ms. 
Sipes hadn't informed the court of any expected delays or conflicts; the Court's clerk indicated 
that Ms. Sipes had mentioned she had a district court heanng, but had expected to be done in 
time for this hearing. 
Mr. Weiskopf then said he wanted it on record that he was very frustrated by this 
circumstance, that the State had witnesses and was ready to proceed with the hearing, that he was 
not asking for sanctions, but that he thought this was "very unfair." The Court said, "I agree with 
you, Mr. Weiskopf. It is unfair, but I don't know what to do about it." (The Court's voice was at 
a normal conversational level, not raised at all, and the Court's tone of voice was one of 
sympathy towards Mr. Weiskopf s position ) Mr. Weiskopf then said, "I don't know what to do 
about it, either." Court then indicated it would take a lunch break at that time and reconvene 




2 Duimg the couise of the certification hearing, while the Court was explaining its 
ruling on an evidentiary objection, Mr Weiskopf rudely interrupted the Court, then le-aigued the 
matter, criticizing the Court's ruling, after the Court reiteiated that it had made its ruling, Mr 
Weiskopf again criticized the ruling, stating that the Court had "aheady shown hostility towards 
the prosecution'5, the Court had not been hostile towards the state, nor were there any giounds for 
concluding so 
3 AA that point the Court advised Mr Weiskopf that his behavioi was mappiopnate, the 
Court dnected Mr Weiskopf that he was not to continue arguing with OT criticizing court 
decisions after a ruling had been made, and that if he did so, he would be found m contempt of 
court, Mr Weiskopf then interrupted the Court while it was making that statement, and a 
sentence or two later, after asking the Court for an explanation of its ruling, interrupted the Court 
again 
4 The Court then took a recess, during the recess, Mr Weiskopf requested a confeience 
in chambers with counsel,~which was granted, Mr Weiskopf, along with Ms Sipes and Ms 
Clark, met with the court m the Court's chambers Once m chambers, Mr Weiskopf referred to 
the ruling made by the Court just before the recess (the Court had refused to admit the written 
statement of a witness who was not present), and indicated that this ruling would impact the 
State's plan to introduce several other documents (such as medical or doctors' statements) into 
evidence without having the authors of the documents present, Mr Weiskopf said he just wanted 
to know what to do m dealing with the introduction of that evidence, Mr Weiskopf then began 
stating why he felt that that type of evidence should be admitted The Court indicated that it had 
made its ruling and that the matter would not be re-argued m chambers 
Mr Weiskopf said he just wanted to deal with the forthcoming evidence, then turned to 
Ms Sipes and Ms Clark, saying he didn't know if they wanted to stipulate to that evidence 
coming m, or what, he then began talking again about why that evidence should be admissible m 
this kind of a hearing The Court then indicated that the issue of stipulating to evidence or not 
was a matter the attorneys should discuss amongst themselves, not before the Court, and repeated 
that the Court would not re-argue the pnor ruling 
Mr Weiskopf then began talking about the ruling again, as all four persons were getting 
up to leave the room, while getting up from its desk, the Court raised its voice and repeated that 
it would not allow re-argument of the ruling and that the attorneys needed to go into the 
courtroom At that point Mr Weiskopf was holding the door open as the other two lawyers 
walked out and the Court, behind its desk and furthest from the door, was also heading around 
the desk and towards the door 
WEISKOPF, David 
Page 3 
Mr Weiskopf, still holding the dooi, turned back to face the Court as it approached the 
door, saying angrily, "Judge, that's two times you ve screamed at me today I haven't raised my 
voice at you at all, but you've screamed at me twice " The Court ttien gestured with an open 
palm towards the open door and quietly said, "Please leave my chambers now " Mr Weiskopf 
started out the door, but looking back at the Court, said angnly, "Judge, I've had it I've had it " 
The Court kept walking, passing Mr Weiskopf at the threshold of the door, saying, "Okay, we'll 
go put this on the record now " All four went into the courtroom 
5 On the record Mr Weiskopf claimed that the Court had screamed at him, both earlier 
m the day (referring to the incident described in paragraph #1 above, claiming that the Court had 
screamed at him, "Well, what do you want me to do about it9") and m chambers, he also claimed 
that, after screaming at him m chambers, the Court had advanced towards him m an angry 
manner and screamed at him again None of those claims were true, and all were disputed on the 
record by the Court and by the others who were present 
6 The Court finds Mr Weiskopf m contempt of court for 
- repeatedly and rudely interrupting the Court while it was attempting to explain 
its rulings, 
- violating the Court's order not to argue with the Court's rulings, 
- his behavior m the Court s chambers continuing to argue with the Court, falsely 
accusing the Court of screaming at him, and making the angry statement, "Judge, I've had 
it I've had it" These were attempts to get the Court to change a prior ruling through 
verbal intimidation, and 
- falsely accusing the Court inappropriate behavior, m an attempt to cast the Court 
m a bad light and m an attempt to excuse or mitigate his own inappropriate behavior 
(claiming that the Court was hostile towards the State, that the Court had screamed at him 
before the hearing began, that the Court had screamed al him in chambers, and claiming 
that the Court had advanced towards him in an angry manner and screamed at him again) 
The Court finds that this conduct constituted contempt of court pursuant to Utah Code Section 
78-32-1(1) and (2) as disorderly, contemptuous, insolent, or boisterous conduct which tended to 
interrupt the due course of a trial or other judicial proceeding, and that, pursuant to Utah Code 
Section 78-32-1(5), he disobeyed the Court's order not to argue with or criticize with court 
rulings once they had been made 
WEISKOPF, David 
Page 4 
7 The Court had initially indicated orally that it would not find contempt of court at that 
time, even though Mi Weiskopf s behavioi would support such a finding, this was pursuant to 
and consistent with this Court's long practice of not taking the matter of contempt of court 
lightly, of being very leery of using the contempt power as a means of disciplining attorneys for 
courtioom behavior, and particularly of making such decisions in the heat of an emotional 
moment, choosing rather to err on the side of restraint until further deliberation is possible, 
although Mr Weiskopf has engaged m contemptible behavior m the past, including a pattern of 
rudely interrupting the court while it is making rulings, as v, ell as arguing and criticizing, in a 
very disrespectful manner, court rulings while and after they are made, this Court has confined 
itself in the past to instructing Mr Weiskopf on proper courtroom behavior, directing him not to 
repeat inappropriate behavior, warning him that he would be found in contempt if such behavior 
was repeated, and meeting with his employer and supervisoi to address the problem 
Upon reflecting upon the matter away from the heat of the moment, this Court recognized 
that those other attempts to address Mr Weiskopf s inappropriate behavior have been 
unsuccessful, that it is incumbent upon this Court to address the matter more directly, and that it 
is appropriate and necessary to invoke the Court's contempt power, for these reasons the Court 
has deteirmned to enter these formal findings of contempt of court at this time 
ORDER 
This matter is set for sentencing on the contempt for Wednesday, May 26, 2004, at 9 00 
a m before this Court Mr Weiskopf is to be present in court at that time The clerk is to provide 
a copy of these Findings to Mr Weiskopf and to Mark Decana, Weber County Attorney 
DATED THIS 21ST DAY OF MAY, 2004 
BY THE COURT 
<^X7?HAJ^ 
Andrus, Judge 
^ f e i ^ ^ 
cc David Weiskopf, Mark Decana fp b 0 L E 
MAY 2 1 2004 




RULING DENYING CONTINUANCE 
DAVID E. WEISKOPF, #7112 
Deputy County Attorney 
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE 
444 - 26th Street, 2nd Floor 
Ogden, UT 84401 
Telephone: (801) 626-3800 
Facsimile: (801) 626-3151 
MAY 2 5 2004 
JUVENILE COURT 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRU-
ST ATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
DAVID E. WEISKOPF 
ORDER GRANTING STATE'S 
MOTION TO CONTINUE 
SENTENCING 
Case No. 444959 
Hon. J. MARK ANDRUS 
Based upon the State's foregoing Motion To Continue Sentencing, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Sentencing scheduled to be heard on May 26, 
2004, at 9:00 A. M. be continued to 
DATED this dayM May, 2004. 
BY THE COURT: 
HON. J. MARK ANDRUS 
Second District Juvenile Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of May, 2004,1 mailed/faxed/delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER 
GRANTING STATE'S MOTION TO CONTINUE SENTENCING to the following-




P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Okay. This is in the matter of David 
Weiskopf. The Court made prior contempt findings and those 
are in writing. This is the sentencing for that contempt 
finding. 
Mr. Weiskopf, did you have anything that you wanted to 
say or present to the Court? 
MR. WEISKOPF: Not at this time, your Honor. I did 
want to review the record but didn't have an opportunity as 
the Court well knows so Ifm not really prepared to say 
anything at this time. Thank you. 
THE COURT: The Court has indicated the written 
findings have already been made available. I've already made 
the findings as to what happened in this case. I note that 
as was alluded to in my findings that there have been past 
behaviors of inappropriate behavior before this Court, 
including arguing with opposing counsel, telling opposing 
counsel to shut up, using profanity in court to express anger 
or frustration as well as interrupting the Court while its 
making findings or explaining its findings in the past, and 
arguing with the Court about rulings which have already been 
made. The latter two are things that were I found occurred 
in this case, they've also occurred in the past. 
Where there has been inappropriate courtroom behavior by 
an attorney, some of the factors important to the Court, of 
3 
course, besides the nature of the behavior which I!ve 
addressed in my written findings is whether there is a 
recognition of wrongdoing, whether there's remorse for it, 
whether there's an expression of a firm intention not to 
repeat the behavior, whether there is a plan for avoiding 
inappropriate behavior in the future particularly where it's 
been a chronic problem or something that has been repeated. 
Also primarily what the Court is after is to have this type 
of behavior cease. Here's what I will do in this case — 
MR. WEISKOPF: Do you want me to stand, your Honor? 
THE COURT: No. You can remain seated. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Okay. 
THE COURT: It will be 30 days in jail, $1,000 fine, 
I will have — two of these days will be forthwith. Two 
hundred of the fine will be paid by 60 days from today. The 
other $800 fine will be suspended and the 28 days in jail 
will be stayed on a day-to-day basis. I'll have standing 
orders that you are to obey all court orders and directions 
in the future. You're not to interrupt the Court when it's 
speaking without permission. Permission can be gained by 
raising your hand or standing and then waiting to be 
recognized by the Court. You're under a standing order not 
to argue with the Court about a ruling after the ruling has 
been made and to not speak rudely to the Court, other 
counsel, other witnesses or other litigants and to not use 
4 
profanity in the court. 
I would intend to use the stayed jail time lift stays for 
violations for these or similar type orders in the future. 
This order will be in effect for one year, in other words, 
the stayed and suspended matters will be in effect for one 
year, and you have a right to appeal this. You have to file 
the appeal within 30 days. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you. 
THE COURT: I don't know what your plans are for the 
future but I like the work you do in this court. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Thank you. 
THE COURT: You work your butt off, you care about 
the kids, and 99 percent of the time you!re a great attorney. 
I would like to see that continue for a long time. And I 
know that I make decisions that are tough and difficult and 
hard to deal with, I just have to make those, and I hope that 
you can find a way to make this work and keep doing the good 
things that youfre doing. 
MR. WEISKOPF: Appreciate it, your Honor. And I 
will, you know. I think myself and my office are committed 
to trying to work with the ,Court and satisfy the Court so 
hopefully that will — 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. WEISKOPF: — work out to everybody's 
satisfaction down the road. I appreciate your interest in 
RULING ON SENTENCING 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF j SENTENCE ON CONTEMPT OF COURT 
DAVID WEISKOPF, | Case No: 444959 
A person over 18 years of age. j CD#: 15 Time#: 904 R#: 1/kl 
On May 21,2004 this Court found David Weiskopf, a Deputy County Attorney for the Weber 
County Attorney's Office, in contempt of court for behavior which occurred on May 11, 2004, and 
for which detailed, written factual findings were made; the sentencing on the contempt was set for 
this day, May 26,2004, at 9:00 a.m., at which time Mr. Weiskopf appeared; Mr. Weiskopf was given 
an opportunity to make a statement or be heard prior to imposition of sentence, but declined to do 
so. 
FINDINGS 
Having considered the matter, the Court, in addition to the factual Contempt Findings 
previously issued, makes additional findings relating to the imposition of sentence: 
1. Besides the inappropriate behavior which occurred during the hearing of May 11, 2004, 
Mr. Weiskopf has engaged in inappropriate behavior in the past, including arguing with opposing 
counsel; telling opposing counsel to "shut up"; using profanity in court to express his anger or 
frustration; interrupting the Court while it is making findings or explaining findings; and arguing 
with the Court about rulings which have already been made. 
2. In assessing the proper sentence for contempt of court, in addition to the seriousness of 
the conduct, chronicity, and other factors, the Court looks at whether there has been a recognition 
of wrong-doing, an expression of remorse, an expression of a firm intention not to repeat the 
behavior, and (particularly for a chronic problem) whether or not there is a plan for avoiding the 
inappropriate behavior in the future; none of these were expressed in the current case, except that, 
after the Court had orally announced the sentence, Mr. Weiskopf did say that he had talked with the 
people in his office and had decided to avoid those behaviors in the future, which was greatly 
appreciated by the Court. 
3. Mr. Weiskopf is a hard-working person who generally demonstrates a concern for doing 
the right thing for the juveniles who come to juvenile court; this Court has observed those traits in 
Mr. Weiskopf for several years. 
The Court makes the following: 
CONTINUED ON PAGE 2 
MAY 26, 2004 
WEISKOPF, David #444959 
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ORDER 
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: Mr. Weiskopf is committed to 30 days 
in the Weber County Jail, two days to be served beginning at 6:00 p.m. on June 11, 2004 until 5:00 
p.m. on June 13, 2004; the remaining 28 days are stayed on a day-to-day basis; $1000 fine, $200 to 
be paid by July 26, 2004; the remaining $800 are suspended on the condition that he comply with 
the orders of the Court. Mr. Weiskopf is under a standing order to: obey all court orders and 
directions; not interrupt the Court when it is speaking without obtaining permission (which may be 
obtained by standing or by raising his hand and waiting to be recognized); not argue with a court 
ruling after it has been made; not speak rudely to the Court, counsel, witnesses, or litigants; and not 
use profanity in court. These conditions will be in effect for one year from today's date, and the 
intention of the Court would be that part or all of the stayed jail time would be lifted upon violation 
of a standing order. The clerk is to provide a copy of this order to Mr. Weiskopf and to Mark 
Decaria, Weber County Attorney. 
This order may be appealed; an appeal must be filed within 30 days. 
DATED THIS 26TH DAY OF MAY, 2004. 
/ ^ ^ ^ t O ^ C O U R T 
\\ \ ^ J/Mark /ghcjfus, Judge 
H_, 
— r~ 
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ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF RULING ON MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
AND TO STAY SENTENCE 
WEISKOPF, David Case No. 444959 
A person over 18 years of age. 
David Weiskopf, by and through his attorney, D. Gilbert Athay, has moved the Court to 
reconsider its contempt order and sentence in the above-entitled matter. Said motion is denied 
for the following reasons: 
Mr. Weiskopf alleges that the Court's oral statement on May 11th constituted a full and 
complete resolution of the matter before the Court, and therefore the matter was concluded and 
was final, and that the Court's later findings should be barred by double jeopardy. A court's oral 
statement does not become a final resolution of the matter unless and until it is reduced to writing 
in a final order; furthermore, even the Court's oral statement on May 11th was that, although Mr. 
Weiskopf s conduct was worthy of contempt, the Court was not making a finding of contempt 
"at that time"; there was one final finding and order regarding the contempt. 
Mr. Weiskopf asserts that the language of Utah Code Section 78-32-3 that contempt 
committed in the immediate view and presence of the court "may be punished summarily" 
requires the court to either punish the matter summarily or not at all. This is not the case. The 
language "may be punished summarily" is clearly permissive; what the court can do summarily, 
it can also do with deliberation. It is always preferable, when possible, for a court to have the 
option to ponder and deliberate before making a decision, rather than being required to act in 
haste; the permissive language of 78-32-3 is consistent with that principle. 
Mr. Weiskopf contends that a contempt finding made pursuant to 78-32-3 must be done 
according to the procedure outlined in 78-32-10. This is also not the case. Section 78-32-3 
describes the procedure for a contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the 
court, while Sections 78-32-4 through 10 describe the procedure for a contempt not committed in 
the immediate view and presence of the court. In the case at bar, the contempt was committed in 
the immediate view and presence of the court, and was appropriately conducted pursuant to 78-
32-3. The fact that the Court set the sentencing over to another day and thereby gave Mr. 
Weiskopf more time and notice than that to which he was entitled, changes neither the nature of 
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There has been no showing of grounds for reversing the Court's finding of contempt, nor 
for staying the execution of the sentence. 
This Court's prior orders are continued in effect. 
DATED THIS 10th DAY OF JUNE, 2004. 
BY THE COURT 
W<==, 
J.M3& Andriis, Judge 
n IJK will* 4 A u 
**^M§s^ 
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